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Abstract
We model a boundedly rational agent who su¤ers from limited attention. The
agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability,
the attention parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximises a prefer-
ence relation within the set of considered alternatives. We show that this random
choice rule is the only one for which the impact of removing an alternative on the
choice probability of any other alternative is asymmetric and menu independent.
Both the preference relation and the attention parameters are identied uniquely
by stochastic choice data.
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1 Introduction
We consider a boundedly rational agent who maximises a preference relation but makes
random choice errors due to imperfect attention. We extend the classical revealed pref-
erence method to this case of bounded rationality, and show how an observer of choice
frequencies can (1) test by means of simple axioms whether the data can have been gen-
erated by the model, and (2) if the answer to (1) is in the a¢rmative, infer uniquely both
preferences and attention.
Most models of economic choice assume deterministic behaviour. The choice responses
are a function c that indicates the selection c (A) the agent makes from menu A. This
holds true both for the classical rational model of preference maximisation (Samuelson
[35], Richter [29]) and for more recent models of boundedly rational choice.1 Yet there is
a gap between such theories and real data, which are noisy: individual choice responses
typically exhibit variability, in both experimental and market settings (McFadden [27]).
The choice responses in our model are given by a probability distribution p that indicates
the probability p(a;A) that alternative a is selected from menu A, as in the pioneering
work of Luce [20], Block and Marschaks [4] and Marschaks [22], and more recently Gul,
Natenzon and Pesendorfer [16] (henceforth, GNP).2
Imperfect attention is what generates randomness and choice errors in our model.
Attention is a central element in human cognition (e.g. Anderson [3]) and was recognized
in economics as early as in the work of Simon [37]. For example, a consumer buying a
new PC is not aware of all the latest models and specications and ends up making a
selection he later regrets;3 a doctor short of time for formulating a diagnosis overlooks the
relevant disease for the given set of symptoms; an ideological voter deliberately ignores
1The works on deterministic choice mentioned in the paper constitute examples for this assertion.
2Stochastic choice has also been used recently as a device in the literature of choice over menus. E.g.
Koida [19] studies how a decision makers (probabilistic) mental states drive the choice of an alternative
from each menu, in turn determining the agents preference for commitment in his choice over menus.
Ahn and Sarver [2] instead use the Gul and Pesendorfers [15] random expected utility model in the second
period of a menu choice model, and show how preference for exibility yields a unique identication of
subjective state probabilities. In this paper we focus on choice from menus.
3Goeree [13] quanties this phenomenon with empirical data.
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some candidates independently of their policies.4 In these examples the decision-maker
is able to evaluate the alternatives he considers (unlike, for example, a consumer who
is uncertain about the quality of a product). Yet, for various reasons the agent misses
some relevant options through unawareness, overlooking, or deliberate avoidance. In these
examples, an agent does not rationally evaluate all objectively available alternatives in
A, but only pays attention to a (possibly strict) subset of them, C (A), which we call the
consideration set following the extensive marketing literature5 on brands and some recent
economics literature discussed below. Once a C (A) has been formed, a nal choice is
made by maximising a preference relation over C (A), which we assume to be standard
(complete and transitive).
This two-step conceptualisation of the act of choice is rooted and well-accepted in
psychology and marketing science, and it has recently gained prominence in economics
through the works of Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [23] - (henceforth, MNO) - and
Eliaz and Spiegler [10], [11]. The core development in our model with respect to earlier
works is that the composition of the consideration set C (A) is stochastic. Each alternative
a is considered with a probability  (a), the attention parameter relative to alternative a.
For example,  (a) may indirectly measure the degree of brand awareness for a product,
or the (complement of) the willingness of an agent to seriously evaluate a political can-
didate. Such partial degrees of awareness or willingness to consider are assumed to be
representable by a probability.6
We view the amount of attention paid to an alternative as a xed characteristic of the
relationship between agent and alternative. The assumption that the attention parameter
is menu independent is undoubtedly a substantive one. It does have, however, empirical
4See Wilson [44] for a consideration set approach to political competition. It is reported there that
African Americans tend to ignore Republican candidates in spite of the overlap between their policy
preferences and the stance of the Republicans, and even if they are dissatised with the Democratic
candidate.
5Originating in Wright and Barbour [45]. See also Shocker, Ben-Akiva, Boccara and Nedungadi [36],
Roberts and Lattin ([31],[32]) and Roberts and Nedungadi [33].
6In some cases one could also adopt a multi-person interpretation, where  (a) measures the proportion
in the population who pays attention to brand or political candidate a.
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support.7 And, at the theoretical level, the hypothesis of independent attention para-
meters is a natural starting point, as on the one hand we show that unrestricted menu
dependence yields a model with no observable restrictions (Theorem 2), and on the other
hand it is not clear a priori what partial restrictions should be imposed on stochastically
menu dependent parameters.
The work by MNO [23] is especially relevant for this paper as it is the rst to study
how attention and preferences can be retrieved from choice data in a consideration set
model of choice. However, the choice responses in their model are deterministic, and like
in many other two-stage deterministic models of choice,8 it is not possible to pin down
the primitives entirely by observing the choice data that it generates, even after imposing
some structure on the rst-stage selection.9 An attractive feature of our model is that
it a¤ords a unique identication of the primitives (preferences and attention parameters)
by means of stochastic choice data. The key observation for preference revelation in our
model generalizes a feature of classical revealed preference analysis. If an alternative a is
preferred to an alternative b, the probability with which a is chosen (in the deterministic
case, whether a is chosen) from a menu cannot depend on the presence of b, whereas the
probability with which b is chosen is a¤ected by the presence of a. As explained in section
3) it is also easy to identify the attention parameters in several choice domains.
The main formal result of the paper is a characterization of the model by means of
two axioms (Theorem 1) that make simple assumptions on the e¤ect of the removal of an
alternative b from a menu A on the choice probability of another alternative a, measured
by the ratio p(a;Anfbg)
p(a;A)
, which we call in short the impact of b on a. Our random choice rule
is the only one for which the impact of b on a is asymmetric (if the presence of b a¤ects the
probability of choosing a from A, then the reverse cannot hold) and menu-independent
(it does not depend on which alternatives are in A beside a and b).
Our model can be viewed, as we detail in section 7.1, as a special type of Random
7For example van Nierop et al [28] estimate an unrestricted probabilistic model of consideration set
membership for product brands, and nd that the covariance matrix of the stochastic disturbances to
the consideration set membership function can be taken to be diagonal.
8E.g. our own "shortlisting" method [21].
9See example in section 6. Tyson [42] claries the general structure of two-stage models of choice.
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Utility Maximisation, and rationalises some plausible types of choice mistakes that cannot
be captured by the Luce [20] rule (the leading type of restriction of Random Utility
Maximisation), in which
p(a;A) = u (a) =
X
b2A
u (b) ,
for some strictly positive utility function u. The Luce rule is equivalent to the multinomial
logit model (McFadden [26]) popular in econometric studies, which assumes the maximi-
sation of a random utility with additive and Gumbel-distributed errors. This is a very
specic error model and it is plausible to conjecture that an agent may make di¤erent
types of mistakes. The Luce rule is incompatible, for example, with choice frequency
reversals of the form p (a; fa; b; cg) > p (b; fa; b; cg) and p (b; fa; bg) > p (a; fa; bg), which
can instead be accommodated by our model in spite of the asymmetry of the preference
relation (see Example 1). Choice frequency reversals of various nature have been observed
experimentally and they are natural when attention inuences choice: for example, a su-
perior but unbranded cereal a may be chosen less frequently than a mediocre but branded
cereal b, simply because a is not noticed. But if a third intermediate cereal c becomes
available, then b will be chosen less often (it will not be chosen whenever c is noticed),
while a will be chosen with the same frequency as before, so that a reversal may occur.
Similarly, in spite of the transitivity of the underlying preference, the random considera-
tion set model is compatible with widely observed forms of stochastic intransitivity that
are instead excluded by Luce (section 4.2).
In section 4 we dwell on the well-known blue bus/red bus type of menu e¤ect (Debreu
[8]), in which an agents odds of choosing a bus over a train increase following the removal
of another bus that di¤ers only in colour. Our model, like some extensions of the Luce rule
(such as the recent one by GNP [16]), provides a story to explain this e¤ect. But it also
shows that a di¤erent type of menu e¤ect, not considered by Debreu and the subsequent
commentators, and not captured by a Luce-type model, can be plausible in the example:
the removal of duplicate alternatives (e.g. a blue bus when a red bus is available) may
well decrease the odds of choosing the remaining duplicate alternatives (by reducing the
attention paid to them) over a third alternative instead of increasing it.
At the axiomatic level, such a di¤erence in behavioural implications between our model
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and Luce-type models well illustrates the crucial importance of the exact specication of
what is meant by menu independence. The Luce rule requires menu independence of the
ratios p(a;A)
p(b;A)
. Applying instead menu independence to the impacts p(a;Anfbg)
p(a;A)
seems equally
natural, and yields (together with asymmetry) an entirely di¤erent model. If one thinks
that preference should be menu independent, then the a priori appeal of one or the other
axiom hinges on a hypothesis about what pattern reveals preference in the data. And, in
turn, this rests on a hypothesis on the cognitive process underlying choice.
2 Random choice rules
There is a nonempty nite set of alternatives X, and a domain D of subsets (the menus)
of X. We allow the agent to not pick any alternative from a menu, so we also assume the
existence of a default alternative a (e.g. walking away from the shop, abstaining from
voting, exceeding the time limit for a move in a game of chess).10 Denote X = X [ fag
and A = A [ fag for all A 2 D.
Denition 1 A random choice rule is a map p : XD ! [0; 1] such that
P
a2A p (a;A) =
1 for all A 2 D and p (a;A) = 0 for all a =2 A.
The interpretation is that p (a;A) denotes the probability that the alternative a 2 A
is chosen when the possible choices (in addition to the default a) faced by the agent are
the alternatives in A. Note that a is the action taken when the menu is empty, so that
p (a;?) = 1.
We dene a new type of random choice rule by assuming that the agent has a strict
preference ordering  on A. The preference  is applied only to a consideration set
C (A)  A of alternatives (the set of alternatives the decision maker pays attention to).
We allow for C (A) to be empty, in which case the agent picks the default option a, so
that p (a; A) is the probability that C (A) is empty. The membership of C (A) for the
alternatives in A is probabilistic. For all A 2 D, each alternative a has a probability
 (a) 2 (0; 1) of being in C (A). Formally:
10For a recent work on allowing not choosing in the deterministic case, see Gerasimou [12]. Earlier
work is Clark [7].
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Denition 2 A random consideration set rule is a random choice rule p; for which
there exists a pair (; ), where  is a strict total order on X and  is a map  : X !
(0; 1), such that11
p; (a;A) =  (a)
Y
b2A:ba
(1   (b)) for all A 2 D, for all a 2 A
3 Characterisation
3.1 Revealed preference and revealed attention
Suppose the choice data are generated by a random consideration set rule. Can we
infer the preference ordering from the choice data? One way to extend the revealed
preference ordering of rational deterministic choice to stochastic choices is to declare
a  b i¤ p (a;A) > p (b; A) for some menu A (see GNP [16]). However, depending on
the underlying choice procedure, a higher choice frequency for a might not be due to a
genuine preference for a over b, and indeed this is not the way preferences are revealed in
the random consideration set model. The discrepancy is due to the fact that an alternative
may be chosen more frequently than another in virtue of the attention paid to it as well
as of its ranking. We consider a di¤erent natural extension of the deterministic revealed
preference that accounts for this feature while retaining the same avour as the standard
non stochastic environment.
In the deterministic case the preference for a over b has (among others) the observable
feature that b can turn from rejected to chosen when a is removed. This feature reveals
unambiguously that a is preferred to b, and has an analog in our random consideration
set framework. When a is ranked below b, there is no event in which the presence of a
in the consideration set matters for the choice of b; therefore if removing a increases the
choice probability of b, it means that a must be better ranked than b. And conversely if
a  b then excising a from A removes the event in which a is considered (in which case b is
not chosen), so that the probability of choosing b increases. Thus p (b; A) > p (b; An fag)
denes the revealed preference relation a  b of our model. We will show that this relation
11We use the convention that the product over the empty set is equal to one.
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is revealed uniquely.12
Next, given a preference , the attention paid to an alternative a is revealed directly
by the probability of choice in any menu in which a is the best alternative. For example
in Theorem 1 we admit all singleton menus, so that  (a) = p (a; fag) = 1   p (a; fag).
However  (a) may be identied even when the choice probabilities from some menus
(singletons in particular) cannot be observed. Provided that there are at least three
alternatives and that binary menus are included in the domain, identication occurs via
the formula
 (a) = 1 
s
p (a; fa; bg) p (a; fa; cg)
p (a; fb; cg)
which must hold since under the model p (a; fb; cg) = (1   (b)) (1   (c)) and therefore
(1   (a))2 p (a; fb; cg) = (1   (a))2 [(1   (b)) (1   (c))]
= [(1   (a)) (1   (b))] [(1   (a)) (1   (c))]
= p (a; fa; bg) p (a; fa; cg) .
This identication strategy can be further generalised using any disjoint menus B and
C instead of the alternatives b and c in the formula.13
These considerations suggest that the restrictions on observable choice data that char-
acterize the model are those ensuring that, rstly, the revealed preference relation  indi-
cated above is well-behaved, i.e. it is a strict total order on the alternatives; and, secondly,
that the observed choice probabilities are consistent with this  being maximised on the
consideration sets that are stochastically generated by the revealed attention parameters.
3.2 Axioms and characterisation theorem
Let us denote
aAb =
p (a;An fbg)
p (a;A)
the impact that an alternative b 2 A 2 D has, in menu A, on another alternative a 2 A
with a 6= b. If aAb > 1 we say that b boosts a and if aAb = 1 that b is neutral for a.
12It is easy to see that p (a;A) = p (a;An fbg) also reveals the preference for a over b in our model
(again in analogy to rational deterministic choice).
13We thank two referees for suggesting these points.
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Our axioms constrain the impacts. The axioms are intended for all A;B 2 D and for all
a; b 2 A \B, a 6= b.
i-Asymmetry. aAb 6= 1) bAa = 1.
i-Independence. aAb = aBb and aAb = aBb.
i-Asymmetry says that if b is not neutral for a in a menu, then a must be neutral for
b in the same menu. Note how this axiom rules out randomness due to utility errors,
while it is compatible with consideration errors. It is a stochastic analog of a property
of rational deterministic choice: if the presence of b determines whether a is chosen, then
b is better than a, and therefore the presence of a cannot determine whether b is chosen.
i-Independence states that the impact of an alternative on another cannot depend
on which other alternatives are present in the menu. It is a simple form of menu-
independence, alternative to Luces IIA (Luce [20]):
Luces IIA. p(a;A)
p(b;A)
= p(a;B)
p(b;B)
.
i-Independence is structurally similar to Luces IIA except that it relates to the impacts
aAb instead of the odd ratios p(a;A)
p(b;A)
. We discuss further in the next section the relationship
between these two properties, which appear a priori equally plausible ways to capture a
notion of menu independence.
A rst interesting implication of the axioms (valid on any domain including all pairs
and their subsets) is instructive on how they act and will be used in the proof of the main
result:
i-Regularity. aAb  1 and aAb  1.
i-Regularity yields by iteration the standard axiom of Regularity (or Monotonicity)14,
and says that if an alternative is not neutral for another alternative then it must boost it.
While it is often assumed directly, this is not a completely innocuous property: it excludes
for example the phenomenon of asymmetric dominance, whereby adding an alternative
that is clearly dominated by a but not by b increases the probability that a is chosen.
14Regularity: A  B ) p (a;A)  p (a;B).
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Lemma 1 Let A 2 D for all A  fa; bg, for all distinct a; b 2 X. Let p be a random
choice rule such that p (a;A) 2 (0; 1) for all a 2 A, for all A 2 Dn?. If p satises
i-Asymmetry and i-Independence then p also satises i-Regularity.
Proof. Let p satisfy the assumptions in the statement. By i-Independence it is su¢cient
to show that a fa; bg b  1 and a fag a  1 for all a; b 2 X. The latter inequality is
immediately seen to be satised since, by the denition of a random choice rule and of
a,
p (a;?)
p (a; fag)
=
1
1  p (a; fag)
> 1
in view of p (a; fag) 2 (0; 1). Next, suppose by contradiction that there exist a; b 2 X
such that a fa; bg b < 1. By i-Independence we have a fa; bg b = a fbg b, that is
p (a; fag)
p (a; fa; bg)
=
p (a;?)
p (a; fbg)
,
p (a; fag) p (a; fbg) = p (a; fa; bg), (1)
(1  p (a; fag)) (1  p (b; fbg)) = 1  p (a; fa; bg)  p (b; fa; bg),
p (a; fag) + p (b; fbg)  p (a; fag) p (b; fbg) = p (a; fa; bg) + p (b; fa; bg) (2)
Moreover the assumption a fa; bg b < 1 implies by i-Asymmetry that b fa; bg a = 1,
that is p (b; fbg) = p (b; fa; bg). Therefore formula 2 simplies to
p (a; fag) (1  p (b; fbg)) = p (a; fa; bg)
implying (since (1  p (b; fbg)) < 1) p (a; fag) > p (a; fa; bg), which contradicts the as-
sumption a fa; bg b < 1.
A useful additional observation is that formula (2) rules out b fa; bg a = 1 = a fa; bg b,
for otherwise the contradiction p (a; fag) p (b; fbg) = 0 would follow. Therefore, in the
presence of i-Independence, i-Asymmetry is in fact equivalent to the stronger version
i-Asymmetry*. aAb 6= 1, bAa = 1.
Our main result is:
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Theorem 1 Let fa; b; cg 2 D for all distinct a; b; c 2 X, and let A 2 D whenever B 2 D
and A  B. Let p be a random choice rule such that p (a;A) 2 (0; 1) for all a 2 A,
for all A 2 Dn?. Then p satises i-Asymmetry and i-Independence if and only if it is a
random consideration set rule p;. Moreover, both  and  are unique, that is, for any
random choice rule p0;0 such that p0;0 = p we have (
0; 0) = (; ).
All remaining proofs are in the Appendix. However, the logic behind the su¢ciency
part of the proof is simple. Under the axioms the revealed preference relation described in
section 3.1 can be shown to be total, asymmetric, and transitive, so that it is taken as our
preference ranking . Given our domain, the attention value  (a) can be dened from
the probabilities p (a; fag). Then the axioms are shown to imply the following property:
whenever b boosts a,
p (a;An fbg) =
p (a;A)
1  p (b; fbg)
.
This is a weak property of stochastic path independence that may be of interest in
itself: it asserts that the boost of b on amust depend only on the strength of b in singleton
choice.15 Finally, the iterated application of this formula shows that the preference and
the attention parameters dened above retrieve in any menu the given choice probabilities
via the assumed procedure.
4 Explaining Menu e¤ects and Stochastic Intransi-
tivity
4.1 Menu e¤ects
Our model suggests that a reason why Luces IIA might not hold is that a third alternative
may be in di¤erent positions (in the preference ranking) relative to a and b and thus may
arguably impact on their choice probabilities in di¤erent ways. For a random consideration
set rule, Luces IIA is only satised for sets A and B that di¤er exclusively for alternatives
each of which is either better or worse than both a and b, but otherwise menu-e¤ects can
15A similar stochastic path independence property appears as an axiom in Yildiz [47].
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arise. So if a  c  b and a; b; c 2 A
p; (a;A)
p; (b; A)
=
 (a)
 (b)
Q
d2A:adb
(1   (d))
>
 (a)
 (b)
Q
d2Anfcg:adb
(1   (d))
=
p; (a;An fcg)
p; (b; An fcg)
violating Luces IIA. In fact, for certain congurations of the attention parameters, the
addition or elimination of other alternatives can even reverse the ranking between the
choice frequencies of two alternatives a and b:
Example 1 (Choice frequency reversal) Let a  c  b and  (b) > (a)
1 (a)
>  (b) (1 
 (c)). Then
p;(a; fa; b; cg) =  (a) >  (b) (1   (a)) (1   (c)) = p (b; fa; b; cg)
and
p;(a; fa; bg) =  (a) <  (b) (1   (a)) = p;(b; fa; bg)
The basis for the choice frequency reversal in our model is that while a better alter-
native a may be chosen with lower probability than an inferior alternative b in pairwise
contests due to low attention for a, the presence of an alternative c that is better than
b but worse than a will reduce the probability that b is noticed without a¤ecting the
probability that a is noticed, and possibly, if c attracts su¢ciently high-attention, to the
point that the initial choice probability ranking between a and b is reversed.16
However, a random consideration set rule does satisfy other forms of menu-independence
and consistency that look a priori as natural as Luces IIA. In addition to i-Independence,
it also satises, for all A 2 D, a 2 A and b; c 2 A:
i-Neutrality. aAc > 1; bAc > 1) aAc = bAc.
i-Neutrality states that an alternative has the same impact on any alternative in the
menu which it boosts. While an interesting property in itself, as it simplies dramatically
16Choice frequency reversals of various nature have been observed experimentally. See e.g. Tsetsos,
Usher and Chater [38].
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the structure of impacts by forcing them to take on only a single value in addition to 1, this
is also a weakening of Luces IIA. In fact, i-Neutrality also states that p(a;Anfcg)
p(b;Anfcg)
= p(a;A)
p(b;A)
under the boosting restriction in the premise (guaranteeing, in our interpretation, that c is
ranked above both a and b), while Luces IIA asserts the same form of menu independence
(and more) unconditionally. Our previous discussion explains why this restriction of
Luces IIA may be sensible.
The dependence of the choice odds on the other available alternatives is often a re-
alistic feature, which applied economist have sought to incorporate, for example, in the
multinomial logit model.17 The blue bus/red bus example (Debreu [8]) is the standard
illustration, in which menu e¤ects occur because of an extreme functional similarity be-
tween two alternatives (a red and a blue bus). Suppose the agent chooses with equal
probabilities a train (t), a red bus (r) or a blue bus (b) as a means of transport in every
binary set, so that the choice probability ratios in pairwise choices for any two alternatives
are equal to 1. Then, on the premise that the agent does not care about the colour of the
bus and so is indi¤erent between the buses, it is argued that adding one of the buses to
a pairwise choice set including t will increase the odds of choosing t over either bus, thus
violating IIA.18
GNP [16] suggest to deal with this form of menu-dependence by proposing that du-
plicate alternatives (such as a red and a blue bus) should be identied observationally,
by means of choice data, and by assuming that duplicate alternatives are (in a specic
sense) irrelevant for choice. In the example each bus is an observational duplicate of the
other because replacing one with the other does not alter the probability of choosing t
in a pairwise contest. The assumption of duplicate elimination says in this example that
the probability of choosing t should not depend on whether a duplicate bus is added to
either choice problem that includes the train.19
17By adding a nested structure to the choice process (nested logit) or by allowing heteroscedasticity of
the choice errors (see e.g. Greene [14] or Agresti [1]). A probit model also allows for menu e¤ects.
18To be pedantic, Debreus original example used as duplicate alternatives two recordings of
Beethovens eighth symphony played by the same orchestra but with two di¤erent directors. As prefer-
ences for directors can be very strong, we use instead McFaddens [26] version of the example.
19The general duplicate elimination assumption is more involved but follows the same philosophy.
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Our model (once straightforwardly adapted to account for preference ties), highlights
however that a new type of menu e¤ect may be plausibly caused by the elimination of
duplicate alternatives. In general, it is immediate to see that two indi¤erent alternatives
in a random consideration set rule are always observational duplicates whenever they
are paid equal attention, but their elimination can have very di¤erent e¤ects depending
on their ranking with respect to the other alternatives. We illustrate this in the blue
bus/red bus example. The preference relation is now a weak order %. We assume that all
alternatives in the consideration set that tie for best are chosen with a given probability,
and otherwise the model is unchanged. Let  (t) = y and  (b) =  (r) = x. Assume rst
that
t  b  r
In this case r and b are duplicates according to GNPs denition because p; (t; fb; tg) =
p (t; fr; tg) = y. The duplicate elimination assumption holds because p; (t; fb; r; tg) =
y. Let  2 (0; 1) be the probability that the blue bus is chosen when both buses are
considered. We have:
p; (b; fb; r; tg)
p; (t; fb; r; tg)
=
(1  y) (x2 + x (1  x))
y
p; (b; fb; tg)
p; (t; fb; tg)
=
(1  y) x
y
and therefore
p;(b;fb;r;tg)
p;(t;fb;r;tg)
p;(b;fb;tg)
p;(t;fb;tg)
= 1  (1  ) x
so that, independently of the attention prole  and of  2 (0; 1),
p; (b; fb; r; tg)
p; (t; fb; r; tg)
<
p; (b; fb; tg)
p; (t; fb; tg)
That is, the odds that the blue bus is chosen over the train necessarily increase when the
red bus is made unavailable, which accords (observationally) with the Debreu story.
Assume instead that
b  r  t
In this case too b and r are duplicates because p; (t; fb; tg) = p; (t; fr; tg) = y (1  x).
But now the duplicate elimination assumption fails since p; (t; fb; r; tg) = y (1  x)
2 6=
p; (t; fb; tg). In addition, we have:
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p; (b; fb; r; tg)
p; (t; fb; r; tg)
=
x2 + x (1  x)
y (1  x)2
p; (b; fb; tg)
p; (t; fb; tg)
=
x
y (1  x)
and therefore
p;(b;fb;r;tg)
p;(t;fb;r;tg)
p;(b;fb;tg)
p;(t;fb;tg)
=
x+ (1  x)
(1  x)
= 1 +
x
1  x
so that independently of the attention prole  and of  2 (0; 1)
p; (b; fb; r; tg)
p; (t; fb; r; tg)
>
p; (b; fb; tg)
p; (t; fb; tg)
Therefore the odds that the blue bus is chosen over the train in this case necessarily
decrease when the red bus is made unavailable, for all possible levels of attention paid to
buses and train, which is the reverse of the Debreu story.
In conclusion, the blue bus/red bus example may be slightly misleading in one respect.
All commentators accept Debreus conclusion that once a red bus is added to the pair
fblue bus, traing, the odds of choosing the train over the blue bus should increase. But
this conclusion is not evident in itself: it must depend on some conjecture about the
cognitive process that generates the choice data. A Luce-like model that captures this
type of process is studied by GNP [16]. The analysis above suggests that menu e¤ects of a
di¤erent type may occur. A consumer faced with multiple bus options may well be more
inclined to choose one of them at the expense of the train option. In short, the random
consideration set rule shows that crude choice probabilities are an insu¢cient guide to
uncovering the underlying preferences: once this is recognised, some menu e¤ects cease
to appear paradoxical.
4.2 Stochastic Intransitivity
Several psychologists, starting from Tversky [39], have noted how choices may well fail
to be transitive. When choice is stochastic there are many ways to dene analogues of
transitive behaviour in deterministic models. A weak such analogue often observed to be
violated in experiments is the following:
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Weak stochastic transitivity: For all a; b; c 2 X, p (a; fa; bg)  1
2
, p (b; fb; cg)  1
2
)
p (a; fa; cg)  1
2
.
It is easy to see that a random consideration set rule can account for violations of
Weak stochastic transitivity, and thus of the stronger version20
Strong stochastic transitivity: For all a; b; c 2 X, p (a; fa; bg)  1
2
, p (b; fb; cg)  1
2
)
p (a; fa; cg)  max fp (a; fa; bg) ; p (b; fb; cg)g.
Consider the following
Example 2 Let  (a) = 4
9
,  (b) = 1
2
and  (c) = 9
10
with a  b  c. We have:
p; (b; fb; cg) =
1
2
p; (c; fa; cg) =
9
10
5
9
=
1
2
but also
p; (b; fa; bg) =
1
2
5
9
=
5
18
<
1
2
violating Weak stochastic transitivity.
The key to obtaining the violation in the example is that the ordering of the attention
parameters is exactly opposite to the quality ordering of the alternatives. It is easy to
check that if the attention ordering weakly agrees with the quality ordering, choices are
stochastically transitive.
Thus, the random consideration set rule reconciles a fundamentally transitive motiva-
tion (the deterministic preference ) with stochastic violations of transitivity in the data.
In contrast, the Luce rule must necessarily satisfy Weak stochastic transitivity.
5 Menu-dependent attention parameters
In some circumstances it may be plausible to assume that the attention parameter of
an alternative depends on which other alternatives are feasible. For example, a brightly
20In their survey on choice anomalies Rieskamp, Busemeyer and Meller [30] write: Does human choice
behavior obey the principle of strong stochastic transitivity? An overwhelming number of studies suggest
otherwise" (p. 646).
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coloured object will stand out more in a menu whose other elements are all grey than in a
menu that only contains brightly coloured objects. In this section we show however that
a less restricted version of our model that allows for the menu dependence of attention
parameters is too permissive. A menu dependent random consideration set rule is a
random choice rule p; for which there exists a pair (; ), where  is a strict total order
on X and  is a map  : X Dn?! (0; 1), such that
p; (a;A) =  (a;A)
Y
b2A:ba
(1   (b; A)) for all A 2 D, for all a 2 A
Theorem 2 For every strict total order  on X and for every random choice rule p for
which p (a;A) 2 (0; 1) for all a 2 A, all A 2 Dn?, there exists a menu dependent random
consideration rule p; such that p = p;.
So, once we allow the attention parameters to be menu dependent, not only does the
model fail to place any observable restriction on choice data, but the preference relation
is also entirely unidentied. Strong assumptions on the function  must be made to make
the model with menu dependent attention useful, but we nd it di¢cult to determine a
priori what assumptions would be appropriate. The available empirical evidence on brands
seems to suggest at best weak correlations between the probabilities of memberships of
the consideration set, and therefore weak menu e¤ects (van Nierop et al. [28]).
6 Related literature
The economics papers that are most related to ours conceptually are MNO [23] and Eliaz
and Spiegler ([10], [11]). Exactly as in their models, an agent in our model who chooses
from menu A maximises a preference relation on a consideration set C (A). The di¤erence
lies in the mechanism with which C (A) is formed (note that in the deterministic case,
without any restriction, this model is empirically vacuous, as one can simply declare
the observed choice from A to be equal to C (A)). While Eliaz and Spiegler focus on
market competition and the strategic use of consideration sets, MNO focus on the direct
testable implications of the model and on the identication of the parameters. Our work
is thus more closely related to that of MNO. When the consideration set formation and
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the choice data are deterministic as in MNO, consider a choice function c for which
c (fa; bg) = a = c (fa; b; cg), c (fb; cg) = b, c (fa; cg) = c. Then (as noted by MNO), we
cannot infer whether (i) a  c (in which case c is chosen over a in a pairwise contest
because a is not paid attention to) or (ii) c  a (in which case c is never paid attention
to). The random consideration set model shows how richer data can help break this type
of indeterminacy. In case (i), the data would show that the choice frequency of a is the
same in fa; b; cg as in fa; bg. In case (ii), the data would show that the choice frequency
of a would be higher in fa; bg than in fa; b; cg.
We next focus on the relationship with models of stochastic choice.
Tverskys ([40], [41]) classical Elimination by Aspects (EBA) rule p", which satises
Regularity, is such that there exists a real valued function U : 2X ! <+ such that for all
A 2 D, a 2 A:
p" (a;A) =
P
BX:B\A6=A U (B) p" (a;B \ A)P
BX:B\A6=? U (B)
There are random consideration set rules that are not EBA rules. Tversky showed that
for any three alternatives a; b; c EBA requires that if p" (a; fa; bg) 
1
2
and p" (b; fb; cg) 
1
2
,
then p" (a; fa; cg)  min fp" (a; fa; bg) ; p" (b; fb; cg)g (Moderate stochastic transitivity).
Example 2 shows that this requirement is not always met by a random consideration set
rule.
Recently, GNP [16] have shown that, in a domain which is rich in a certain technical
sense, the Luce model is equivalent to the following Independence property (which is an or-
dinal version of Luces IIA): p (a;A [ C)  p (b; B [ C) implies p (a;A [D)  p (b; B [D)
for all sets A;B;C and D such that (A [ B) \ (C [ D) = ?. They also generalise the
Luce rule to the Attribute Rule in such a way as to accommodate red bus/blue bus type
of violations of Luces IIA (see section 4). We have seen that a random consideration set
rule violates one of the key axioms (duplicate elimination) for an Attribute Rule. And
the choice frequency reversal Example 1 violates the Independence property above.
Mattsson and Weibull [25] obtain an elegant foundation for (and generalisation of) the
Luce rule. In their model the agent (optimally) pays a cost to get close to implementing
any desired outcome (see also Voorneveld [43]). More precisely, the agent has to exert
more e¤ort the more distant the desired probability distribution from a given default
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distribution. When the agent makes an optimal trade-o¤ between the expected payo¤
and the cost of decision control, the resulting choice probabilities are a distortion of
the logit model, in which the degree of distortion is governed by the default distribution.
Our paper shares with this work the broad methodology to focus on a detailed model
to explain choice errors. However, it is also very di¤erent in that Mattsson and Weibull
assume a (sophisticated form of) rational behaviour on the part of the agent. One may
then wonder whether utility-maximisation errors might not occur at the stage of making
optimal tradeo¤s between utility and control costs, raising the need to model those errors.
A second major di¤erence stems from the fact that our model uses purely ordinal pref-
erence information. Similar considerations apply to the recent wave of works on rational
inattention, such as Matµejka and McKay [24], Cheremukhin, Popova and Tutino [6], and
Caplin and Dean [5], in which it is assumed that an agent solves the problem of allocating
attention optimally.
Recently, Rubinstein and Salant [34] have proposed a general framework to describe
an agent who expresses di¤erent preferences under di¤erent frames of choice. The link
with this paper is that the set of such preferences is interpreted as a set of deviations
from a true (welfare relevant) preference, so this is a model of mistakes. However, the
deviations are not analysed as stochastic events.
Finally, we note that the appeal of a two stage structure with a stochastic rst stage
extends beyond economics, from psychology to consumer science. In philosophy in par-
ticular, it has been taken by some (e.g. James [18], Dennett [9], Heisenberg [17]) as a
fundamental feature of human choices, and as a solution of the general problem of free
will.
7 Concluding remarks21
7.1 Random consideration sets and RUM
A Random Utility Maximization (RUM) rule [4] is dened by a probability distribution 
on the possible rankings R of the alternatives and the assumption that the agent picks the
21We thank the referees for suggesting most of the insights in this section.
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top element of the R extracted according to . Block and Marschak [4], McFadden [26]
and Yellot [46] have shown that the Luce model is a particular case of a RUM rule, in which
a systematic utility is subject to additive random shocks that are Gumbel distributed. A
random consideration set rule (; ) is a di¤erent special type of RUM rule, in which 
is restricted as follows:
  (R) = 0 for any ranking R for which there are alternatives a; b with a  b, bRa,
aRa and bRa (that is, if R contradicts  on some pair of alternatives, then at
least one of these alternatives must be R inferior to a);
 for any alternative a,  (fR : aRag) =  (a) (that is, the probability of the set of
all rankings for which a is ranked above a coincides with the probability that a is
noticed);
 for any two alternative a and b,  (fR : aRa and bRag) =  (a)  (b) (that is, the
events of any two alternatives being ranked above a are independent).
For example, a random consideration set rule with two alternatives (beside the default)
such that  (a) = 1
2
,  (b) = 1
3
and a  b could be represented by the following RUM rule:22
 (aba) = 1
6
,  (aab) = 1
3
, (baa) = 1
6
,  (aab) =  (aba) = 1
6
,  (baa) = 0.
An appealing interpretation of this type of RUM is that the agent is in the mood
for an alternative a with probability  (a) (and otherwise prefers the default alternative),
and picks the preferred one among all alternatives for which he is in the mood. While
indistinguishable in terms of pure choice data, the RUM interpretation and the consider-
ation set interpretation imply di¤erent attitudes of the agent to implementation errors:
if a is chosen but b  a is implemented by mistake (e.g. a dish di¤erent from the one
ordered is served in a restaurant), the agent will have a positive reaction if he failed to
pay attention to b, but he will have a negative reaction if he was not in the mood for b.
7.2 Comparative attention
The model suggests a denition of comparative attention based on observed choice prob-
abilities. Say that (1; 1) is more attentive than (2; 2), denoted (1; 1) (2; 2),
22Where a ranking is denoted by listing the alternatives from top to bottom.
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i¤ p1;1 (a
; A) < p2;2 (a
; A) for all A 2 D. With the domain of theorem 1, we have
that (1; 1) (2; 2) i¤ 1 (a) > 2 (a) for all a 2 X (the if direction follows imme-
diately from the formula p; (a
; A) =
Q
a2A
(1   (a)), while the other direction follows
from p; (a
; fag) = (1   (a)) applied to each fag 2 D). Observe that for two agents
with the same preferences, (; 1) is more attentive than (; 2) i¤ agent 1 makes bet-
ter choices from each menu in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance, that is
p;1 (a  b; A) > p;2 (a  b; A) for all b 2 A with b 6= max (A;), where p; (a  b; A)
denotes the probability of choosing an alternative in A better than b.
On general domains (without the assumption that all singleton menus are included
in the domain) the implication (1; 1) (2; 2) ) 1 (a) > 2 (a) for all a 2 X does
not necessarily hold. However, in a one-parameter version of the model in which all
alternatives receive the same attention g 2 (0; 1), it follows from the formula p;g (a
; A) =
(1  g)jAj that (1; g1) (2; g2) i¤ g1 > g2.
7.3 A model without default
A natural companion of our model that does not postulate a default alternative is one
in which whenever the agent misses all alternatives he is given the option to reconsider,
repeating the process until he notices some alternative. This leads to choice probabilities
of the form:
p; (a;A) =
 (a)
Q
b2A:ba
(1   (b))
1 
Q
b2A
(1   (b))
This model does not have the same identiability properties as ours. For example,
take the case X = fa; bg, with p (a; fa; bg) =  and p (b; fa; bg) = .23 These observations
(which fully identify the parameters in our model) are compatible with both the following
continua of possibilities:
 a  b and any  such that (a)
1 (a)
= 

 (b);
 b  a and any  such that (b)
1 (b)
= 

 (a).
23Obviously in this model p (a; fag) = 1 for all a 2 X.
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Nevertheless, the model is interesting and it would be desirable to have an axiomatic
characterisation of it. We leave this as an open question.
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8 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
The necessity part of the statement is immediately veried by checking the formula and
thus omitted here (see the online appendix). For su¢ciency, let p be a random choice rule
that satises i-Asymmetry and i-Independence. By Lemma 1 p also satises i-Regularity,
and by the observation after the proof of Lemma 1 it satises i-Asymmetry* (below we will
highlight where this stronger version of i-Asymmetry is needed). Dene a binary relation
R on X by aRb i¤ aAb > 1 for some A 2 D, a; b 2 A, i.e. i¤ p (b; An fag) > p (b; A).
We show that R is total, asymmetric and transitive. For totality, given a; b 2 X, suppose
aAb  1 for some A 2 D (by the domain assumption there exists an A 2 D such that
aAb is well-dened); then by i-Regularity aAb = 1 and by i-Asymmetry* bAa > 1. For
asymmetry, suppose aAb > 1 for some A 2 D; then by i-Asymmetry bAa = 1 and by
i-Independence bBa = 1 for all B 3 a; b, B 2 D.
For transitivity, let aRbRc, so that bAa > 1 and cBb > 1 for some A;B 2 D. Therefore
by i-Independence
b fa; b; cg a > 1
c fa; b; cg b > 1
b fa; bg a > 1
c fb; cg b > 1
(these impacts are well-dened by the domain assumption) and then by i-Asymmetry
a fa; b; cg b = 1 = b fa; b; cg c
a fa; bg b = 1 = b fb; cg c
Suppose that, contrary to transitivity, not (aRc), so that by totality cRa, i.e. there
exists C 2 D such that aCc > 1 and thus by i-Independence
a fa; b; cg c > 1
a fa; cg c > 1
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and then by i-Asymmetry
c fa; b; cg a = 1 = c fa; cg a
In short, the above displayed formulas imply the following system:
p (a; fag) = p (a; fa; bg) > p (a; fa; cg) = p (a; fa; b; cg)
p (b; fbg) = p (b; fb; cg) > p (b; fa; bg) = p (b; fa; b; cg)
p (c; fcg) = p (c; fa; cg) > p (c; fb; cg) = p (c; fa; b; cg)
(3)
Furthermore, i-Independence also implies:
p (a;?)
p (a; fag)
=
p (a; fbg)
p (a; fa; bg)
=
p (a; fcg)
p (a; fa; cg)
=
p (a; fb; cg)
p (a; fa; b; cg)
or
1
1  p (a; fag)
=
1  p (b; fbg)
1  p (a; fa; bg)  p (b; fa; bg)
1
1  p (a; fag)
=
1  p (c; fcg)
1  p (a; fa; cg)  p (c; fa; cg)
1
1  p (a; fag)
=
1  p (b; fb; cg)  p (c; fb; cg)
1  p (a; fa; b; cg)  p (b; fa; b; cg)  p (c; fa; b; cg)
which using formulas (3) can be re-written as:
1
1  p (a; fa; bg)
=
1  p (b; fb; cg)
1  p (a; fa; bg)  p (b; fa; bg)
(4)
1
1  p (a; fa; bg)
=
1  p (c; fa; cg)
1  p (a; fa; cg)  p (c; fa; cg)
(5)
1
1  p (a; fa; bg)
=
1  p (b; fb; cg)  p (c; fb; cg)
1  p (a; fa; cg)  p (b; fa; bg)  p (c; fb; cg)
(6)
But the solution to these equations requires p (c; fa; cg) = p (c; fb; cg) (see the online
appendix for the workout), contradicting the third line in (3), and we can conclude that
R is transitive.
Finally, concerning R, observe that (using i-Asymmetry* and i-Independence) the
following three statements are equivalent:
aRb
p (b; An fag) > p (b; A) for all A 2 D with a; b 2 A
p (a;An fbg) = p (a;A) for all A 2 D with a; b 2 A (7)
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Next, we show that for all A 2 D, the following implication holds:
p (a;An fbg) > p (a;A))
p (a;An fbg)
p (a;A)
=
1
1  p (b; fbg)
(8)
for all a 2 A and b 2 A. We begin by proving (8) for a = a. Suppose rst that A = fbg
for some b 2 X. Since p (a;?) = 1 and p (a; fbg) = 1  p (b; fbg), we have
p (a;?)
p (a; fbg)
=
1
1  p (b; fbg)
(9)
so that the assertion holds for this case. Then applying i-Independence to (9) we have
immediately
p (a; An fbg)
p (a; fAg)
=
1
1  p (b; fbg)
for all A 2 D, for all b 2 A. Next, x a; b 2 A and assume p (a;An fbg) > p (a;A), so that
by i-Asymmetry p (b; An fag) = p (b; A). Using this equation and i-Independence yields
p (a;An fbg)
p (a;A)
=
p (a; fag)
p (a; fa; bg)
=
1  p (a; fag)
1  p (b; fa; bg)  p (a; fa; bg)
=
1  p (a; fag)
1  p (b; fbg)  p (a; fa; bg)
and since as shown before
p (a; fag) =
p (a; fa; bg)
1  p (b; fbg)
we have
p (a;An fbg)
p (a;A)
=
1  p(a
;fa;bg)
1 p(b;fbg)
1  p (b; fbg)  p (a; fa; bg)
=
1
1  p (b; fbg)
This concludes the proof that formula (8) holds.
Now dene = R and  (a) = p (a; fag) for all a 2 X. We show that p; = p. Fix
A 2 D and number the alternatives so that A = fa1; :::; ang and ai  aj , i < j. For all
a 2 A the implication in (8) and the denitions of  and  imply that
p (ai; A) = p (ai; fa2; :::; ang) (1   (a1))
...
= p (ai; fai; :::; ang)
Y
j<i
(1   (aj))
= p (ai; faig)
Y
j<i
(1   (aj))
=  (ai)
Y
j<i
(1   (aj)) = p; (ai; A)
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where p (ai; faig) = p (ai; fai; :::; ang), which is used to move from the second to the third
line, follows from the properties of R in (7) (note that the probabilities in the display are
all well-dened by the domain assumption).
To conclude we show that  and  are dened uniquely. Let p0;0 be another consid-
eration set rule for which p0;0 = p, and suppose by contradiction that 
0 6=. So there
exist a; b 2 X such that a  b and b 0 a. Take A = fag [ fc 2 X : a  cg, so that b 2 A
for some b with b 0 a. By denition,
p; (a;A) =  (a) = p; (a;B)
for all B  A such that a 2 B, but also
p0;0 (a;A) = 
0 (a)
Y
c2A:c0a
(1  0 (c)) < 0 (a)
Y
c2Anfbg:c0a
(1  0 (c)) = p0;0 (a;An fbg)
a contradiction in view of p0;0 = p = p;. So  is unique. The uniqueness of  is
immediate from p (a; fag) =  (a).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let p be a random choice rule. Let  be an arbitrary strict total
order of the alternatives. Dene  by setting, for A 2 Dn? and a 2 A:
 (a;A) =
p (a;A)
1 
P
b2A:ba
p (b; A)
(10)
We have  (a;A) > 0 since p (a;A) > 0, and we have  (a;A) < 1 since 1 > p (a;A) +P
b2A:ba
p (b; A) (given that p (a; A) > 0).
For the rest of the proof x a 2 A. We dene
p; (a;A) =  (a;A)
Y
b2A:ba
(1   (b; A))
and show that p; (a;A) = p (a;A). Using the denition of , for all b 2 A we have
1   (b; A) =
1 
P
c2A:cb
p (c; A)  p (b; A)
1 
P
c2A:cb
p (c; A)
(11)
so that Y
b2A:ba
(1   (b; A)) =
Y
b2A:ba
1 
P
c2A:cb
p (c; A)  p (b; A)
1 
P
c2A:cb
p (c; A)
(12)
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Given any b 2 A, denote by b+ 2 A the unique alternative for which b+  b and there
is no c 2 A such that b+  c  b. Letting b 2 fc 2 A : c  ag, from (11) we have that
1  
 
b+; A

=
1 
P
c2A:cb+
p (c; A)  p (b+; A)
1 
P
c2A:cb+
p (c; A)
=
1 
P
c2A:cb
p (c; A)
1 
P
c2A:cb+
p (c; A)
As the numerator of the expression for 1    (b+; A) is equal to the denominator of
the expression for 1   (b; A), the product in (12) is a telescoping product (where observe
that for the   maximal term in A the denominator is equal to 1), and we thus have:Y
b2A:ba
(1   (b; A)) = 1 
X
b2A:ba+
p (b; A)  p
 
a+; A

= 1 
X
b2A:ba
p (b; A)
We conclude that
p; (a;A) =  (a;A)
Y
b2A:ba
(1   (b; A))
=
p (a;A)
1 
P
b2A:ba
p (b; A)
 
1 
X
b2A:ba
p (b; A)
!
= p (a;A)
as desired (where the rst term in the second line follows from (10)).
Possible online appendices
A Necessity of the axioms
i-Asymmetry. aAb 6= 1) bAa = 1.
Let p; be a random consideration set rule. For all A 2 D, all a; b 2 A with b 6= a:
p; (a;An fbg)
p; (a;A)
=
 (a)
Q
c2Anfbg:ca
(1   (c))
 (a)
Q
c2A:ca
(1   (c))
=
8<
:
1
1 (b)
if b  a
1 if a  b
so that aAb = 1, a  b. Therefore if aAb 6= 1 we have b  a and thus bAa = 1.
30
i-Independence. aAb = aBb and aAb = aBb.
Let p; be a random consideration set rule. Then for all A;B 2 D and for all a; b 2 A\B,
a 6= b:
p; (a;An fbg)
p; (a;A)
=
 (a)
Q
c2Anfbg:ca
(1   (c))
 (a)
Q
c2A:ca
(1   (c))
=
8<
:
1
1 (b)
if b  a
1 if a  b
=
 (a)
Q
c2Bnfbg:ca
(1   (c))
 (a)
Q
c2B:ca
(1   (c))
=
p; (a;Bn fbg)
p; (a;B)
as desired. Similarly, we have
p; (a
; An fbg)
p; (a; A)
=
Q
c2Anfbg
(1   (c))Q
c2A
(1   (c))
=
1
1   (b)
=
Q
c2Bnfbg
(1   (c))Q
c2B
(1   (c))
=
p; (a;Bn fbg)
p; (a;B)
In the text we reported that the random consideration set rule satises i-Neutrality -
below we show that i-neutrality is indeed necessary:
i-Neutrality. aAc > 1; bAc > 1) aAc = bAc for all A 2 D, a 2 A and b; c 2 A.
Let p; be a random consideration set rule. For all A 2 D, a 2 A
 and b; c 2 A with
c 6= a:
aAc =
p; (a;An fcg)
p; (a;A)
=
 (a)
Q
d2Anfcg:da
(1   (d))
 (a)
Q
d2A:da
(1   (d))
=
8<
:
1
1 (c)
if c  a
1 if a  c
so that aAc > 1, aAc = 1
1 (c)
for all a 2 A such that a 6= a, while if a = a, then
aAb =
p; (a
; An fcg)
p; (a; A)
=
Q
d2Anfcg:da
(1   (d))Q
d2A:da
(1   (d))
=
1
1   (c)
Therefore aAc > 1 and bAc > 1 imply aAc = 1
1 (c)
= aAb.
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B Transitivity of R in the proof of Theorem 1
Recall the conditions from the proof:
p (a; fag) = p (a; fa; bg) > p (a; fa; cg) = p (a; fa; b; cg)
p (b; fbg) = p (b; fb; cg) > p (b; fa; bg) = p (b; fa; b; cg)
p (c; fcg) = p (c; fa; cg) > p (c; fb; cg) = p (c; fa; b; cg)
(3)
and
1
1  p (a; fa; bg)
=
1  p (b; fb; cg)
1  p (a; fa; bg)  p (b; fa; bg)
(4)
1
1  p (a; fa; bg)
=
1  p (c; fa; cg)
1  p (a; fa; cg)  p (c; fa; cg)
(5)
1
1  p (a; fa; bg)
=
1  p (b; fb; cg)  p (c; fb; cg)
1  p (a; fa; cg)  p (b; fa; bg)  p (c; fb; cg)
(6)
To see that the system above yields p (c; fb; cg) = p (c; fa; cg), we simplify by using
a product notation for sets and dropping the curly brackets. Given our restrictions on
probabilities, (4) yields
1  p (a; ab)  p (b; ab) = 1  p (b; bc)  p (a; ab) + p (a; ab) p (b; bc),
p (b; ab) = p (b; bc)  p (a; ab) p (b; bc) (13)
while (5) yields
1  p (a; ac)  p (c; ac) = 1  p (c; ac)  p (a; ab) + p (a; ab) p (c; ac),
p (a; ac) = p (a; ab)  p (a; ab) p (c; ac) (14)
and (6) yields:
1  p (a; ac)  p (b; ab)  p (c; bc) =
= 1  p (b; bc)  p (c; bc)  p (a; ab) + p (a; ab) p (b; bc) + p (a; ab) p (c; bc)
, p (a; ac) = p (b; bc) + p (a; ab)  p (b; ab)  p (a; ab) p (b; bc)  p (a; ab) p (c; bc) (15)
Substituting the expression for p (a; ac) from (15) into (14) yields
p (a; ab)  p (a; ab) p (c; ac) =
= p (b; bc) + p (a; ab)  p (b; ab)  p (a; ab) p (b; bc)  p (a; ab) p (c; bc)
, p (b; ab) = p (a; ab) p (c; ac) + p (b; bc)  p (a; ab) p (b; bc)  p (a; ab) p (c; bc) (16)
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and substituting the expression for p (b; ab) from (13) in (16) yields
p (b; bc)  p (a; ab) p (b; bc)
= p (a; ab) p (c; ac) + p (b; bc)  p (a; ab) p (b; bc)  p (a; ab) p (c; bc)
, p (a; ab) p (c; bc) = p (a; ab) p (c; ac)
, p (c; bc) = p (c; ac)
C Independence of the axioms
First we recall the axioms - next we provide examples of random choice rules that fail
to satisfy only one of the axioms, and show that they are not random consideration set
rules.
i-Asymmetry. aAb 6= 1) bAa = 1.
i-Independence. aAb = aBb and aAb = aBb.
Fails only i-Asymmetry. Let X = fa; bg, and assume choice probabilities are as in the
table below:
p (a; Si) p (b; Si) p (a
; Si)
S1 fa; bg x y 1  x  y
S2 fag
x+(1 )y
1 y
- 1  x+(1 )y
1 y
= 1 x y
1 y
S3 fbg - y 1  y
? - - 1
Table 1: A random choice rule that fails i-Asymmetry
where x; y > 0, x + y < 1 and  2

1
1 x
; x+y
y

. We have that x+y
y
< 1
y
, ensuring that
p (a; fbg) = 1 y > 0, while the upper bound on  also ensures that p (a; fag) < 1. This
random choice rule fails i-Asymmetry, since p(a;S1nfbg)
p(a;S1)
= x+(1 )y
x(1 y)
< 1 (since  > 1
1 x
) and
p(b;S1nfag)
p(b;S1)
=  > 1. i-Independence holds trivially for a and b. For the default alternative:
p(a;S1nfag)
p(a;S1)
= p(a
;fbg)
p(a;fa;bg)
= 1 y
1 x y
= p(a
;?)
p(a;fag)
= p(a
;S2nfag)
p(a;S2)
p(a;S1nfbg)
p(a;S1)
= p(a
;fag)
p(a;fa;bg)
=
1 x y
1 y
1 x y
= 1
1 y
= p(a
;?)
p(a;fbg)
= p(a
;S3nfbg)
p(a;S3)
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so that i-Independence holds. Finally we show directly that there is no p; that returns
the above probabilities. First of all, by the arguments in the proof of theorem 1 it must
be that  (a) = x+(1 )y
1 y
and  (b) = y. If a  b, then
p; (b; fa; bg) =  (b) (1   (a)) =
(1  x  y)y
1  y
6= y = p (b; fa; bg)
where the inequality follows from our assumption that  > 1
1 x
. Next, if b  a, then
p; (a; fa; bg) =  (a) (1   (b)) =
x+ (1  ) y
1  y
(1  y) = x+(1  ) y 6= x = p (a; fa; bg)
where the inequality follows from  > 1
1 x
> 1 and y > 0.
Fails only i-Independence: Let X = fa; bg, and assume choice probabilities are as in
the table below:
p (a; Si) p (b; Si) p (a
; Si)
S1 fa; bg x y 1  x  y
S2 fag x - 1  x
S3 fbg - y 1  y
? - - 1
Table 2: A random choice rule that fails i-Independence
where x; y > 0, x+ y < 1 and  2

1; 1
y

with  6= 1
1 x
. While i-Asymmetry holds (since
aS1b = 1 and bS1a =  6= 1), i-Independence does not, since
p(a;S1nfag)
p(a;S1)
= p(a
;fbg)
p(a;fa;bg)
= 1 y
1 x y
6= 1
1 x
= p(a
;?)
p(a;fag)
= p(a
;S2nfag)
p(a;S2)
where the inequality follows from our assumption  6= 1
1 x
.
To see that there is no p; that returns the above probabilities, observe that by the
usual arguments it must be  (a) = x and  (b) = y. Now if a  b we have
p; (b; fa; bg) =  (b) (1   (a)) = y (1  x) 6= y = p (b; fa; bg)
where the inequality follows from  6= 1
1 x
. If instead b  a, then
p; (a; fa; bg) =  (a) (1   (b)) = x (1  y) 6= x = p (a; fa; bg)
where the inequality follows from ; y > 0.
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